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COMMENT
BRUCE E. FEIN*
Over a century ago, Lord Gladstone lionized the United States
Constitution as "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given
time by the brain and purpose of man."' The Constitution, how-
ever, is not self-executing. Its intellectual sinews must be continu-
ally exercised and tested to insure fidelity to the Constitution's
political philosophy, especially its checks and balances among rival
branches of government. As John Stuart Mill noted in On Liberty,2
creeds of all kinds are wont to a passive death unless they are re-
ceived actively, with a lively apprehension of the truths which they
extol. If the Constitution is to live for the ages, its bedrock princi-
ples must be actively understood and vigorously debated.
The bicentennial of the Constitution is a fitting occasion for
lawyers to explore what should be the legal standards for its inter-
pretation and whether errant standards are the source of malfunc-
tioning in the federal judiciary. Attorneys who stand aloof or
ignorant of fundamental constitutional disputes endanger the public
interest. During the Reconstruction era, for example, our Constitu-
tion was repeatedly defiled by the radical Reconstruction Con-
gresses because of attorney indifference to constitutional principles.
As Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles then remonstrated:
It is unfortunate for the country that there is such a pre-
ponderance of lawyers in our public councils. Their tech-
nical training and extensive, absorbing practice unfit them
to be statesmen. They are ready to take either side of a
case for a fee, and will labor as earnestly for the side they
know to be wrong as for the right. Their influence is often
bad. They will, for party ends, warp and pervert the plain-
est provisions of the Constitution.3
Contemporary federal courts are flooded with imaginative con-
stitutional claims largely because the United States Supreme Court
and most subordinate federal judges have disavowed the under-
* Heritage Foundation Visiting Fellow for Constitutional Studies; Adjunct Consti-
tutional Scholar, American Enterprise Institute. B.A., University of California at Berk-
ley, 1969; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972.
1. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, N. AM. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1878, at 185.
2. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1976).
3. 3 THE DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 480-81 (Houghton-Mifflin 1911).
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standing of the Constitution's authors that constitutional interpreta-
tion would be controlled by the intent or purpose of each provision.
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens, for instance,
have disputed the theory of original intent in extra-judicial pro-
nouncements. Justice Brennan recently maintained:
[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope
with current problems and current needs. What the consti-
tutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times
cannot be their measure to the vision of our time.4
In other words-to borrow from the brilliant characterization of So-
licitor General Charles Fried-Brennan, Stevens, and their follow-
ers champion the idea that the contemporary constitutional text is
but a "homonym" of the original document.5
The argument over the original-intent standard for constitu-
tional interpretation is at bottom a dispute over the magnitude of
policymaking power that should be entrusted to an appointed, life-
tenured federal judiciary under a Constitution in which government
by elected representatives is the norm. When the intent of our con-
stitutional authors does not govern judicial interpretation, individ-
ual judges invariably smuggle their idiosyncratic notions of wise
public policy into constitutional decrees. What, for instance, are Roe
v. Wade6 and sequel ukases of the Supreme Court other than judicial
assertions that permitting women to abort fetuses would commend
itself to an enlightened community? The constitutional right of pri-
vacy conjured up by the Supreme Court was more the product of
judicial imagination than of cogitation, and has led to such absurd
conclusions as equating the interest of the father in a prospective
childbirth with the interest of the state.
Clear and convincing evidence confirms that the doctrine of
original intent is the only legitimate judicial guide for constitutional
jurisprudence. The doctrine was embraced by James Madison, "Fa-
ther of the Constitution," and his political and intellectual compan-
ions, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. Madison lectured
that if "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified
4. W. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification
7 (Oct. 12, 1985) (lecture delivered at Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown Uni-
versity) (available at the Varyland Law Review).
5. Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 751, 757 (1987).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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by the nation.., be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no
security . . . for a faithful exercise of its powers."' 7 And Jefferson
admonished that "[ojur peculiar security is in the possession of a
written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construc-
tion .... Let us go then perfecting it by adding, by way of amend-
ment to the Constitution, those powers which time and truth show
are wanting.' '8
Open-ended interpretation of the Constitution is also incom-
patible with the vision of the judicial function etched by Alexander
Hamilton. In The Federalist No. 78 Hamilton labeled as misconduct
the substitution ofjudicial will for "the constitutional intentions of
the legislature." 9 If the courts were "disposed to exercise WILL in-
stead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would .. .be the substitu-
tion of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."'"
Hamilton further remarked on the need to curb "an arbitrary
discretion in the courts" by tying the courts "down by strict rules
and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in
every particular case that comes before them."'" The intent theory
of constitutional interpretation achieves the goal of circumscribing
judicial discretion by providing strict rules to inform courts, whereas
theories based on something other than intent invite whimsical judi-
cial interpretations.
Further, in The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton denies the charge
that "[t]he power of construing the laws, according to the spirit of
the constitution, will enable [the Supreme Court] to mould them
into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions
will not be in any matter subject to the revision or correction of the
legislative body."' 2 Hamilton avows that "there is not a syllable" in
the Constitution that empowers the federal courts to interpret that
instrument according to its "spirit," or gives them an interpretive
latitude broader than that possessed by state courts."
Neither Madison norJefferson nor Hamilton was engaged in an
intellectual frolic. Their views regarding original intent were em-
braced by two legal giants who dominated the Supreme Court for
one-third of a century: Chief Justice John Marshall and Associate
7. See THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 911 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910).
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), reprinted in 10
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 10-11 (P. Ford ed. 1904-1905).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 526 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 529.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 542 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
13. Id. at 543.
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Justice Joseph Story. Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons v.
Ogden: 1
4
The enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution,
and the people who adopted it, must be understood to
have employed words in their natural sense, and to have
intended what they said. . . . [W]e know of no rules for
construing [the Constitution] other than are given by the
language of the instrument... taken in connection with the
purpose for which [federal powers] were conferred.' 5
Justice Story echoed Marshall's theory of constitutional inter-
pretation. He taught:
In construing the Constitution of the United States, we are
in the first instance to consider, what are its nature and ob-
jects, its scope and design, as apparent from the structure
of the instrument, viewed as a whole and also viewed in its
component parts. Where its words are plain, clear and de-
terminate, they require no interpretation .... Where the
words admit of two senses, each of which is conformable to
general usage, that sense is to be adopted, which without
departing from the literal import of the words, best harmo-
nizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design of
the instrument. 1
6
The doctrine of original intent does not limit judicial interpre-
tation to addressing only the specific evils that animated the framers
when the clause under consideration was introduced into the Con-
stitution. As ChiefJustice Marshall elaborated in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward: 7
It is not enough to say, that this particular case was not in
the mind of the Convention, when the article was framed,
nor of the American people, when it was adopted. It is nec-
essary to go farther, and to say that, had this particular case
been suggested, the language would have been so varied,
as to exclude it, so it would have been made a special
exception. 1'
The opinions of Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, Marshall, and
Story are entitled to great weight in the original intent debate. Not
only were they acknowledged political and judicial giants, but their
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
15. Id. at 18.
16. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (1870).
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
18. Id. at 643.
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lives were contemporaneous with the Constitution's birth. The
quintet is thus more likely than later generations to have correctly
discerned tacit or express political understandings regarding the in-
tended standard for constitutional interpretation.
The common criticisms of the original intent theory are answer-
able. It is said that the Constitution cannot be adapted to changing
circumstances and unforeseen technology if shackled by original in-
tent. And Chief Justice Marshall, it is noted, recognized in McCul-
loch v. Maryland 9 that the founding fathers intended the
Constitution to endure for ages to come and to address unforesee-
able crises in human affairs.
Marshall's words, however, were uttered in conjunction with a
defense of the broad powers of Congress, not the courts, to address
new problems by enacting laws under the necessary and proper
clause of article .20 That clause, coupled with congressional power
over interstate commerce, the general welfare clause, the fourteenth
amendment, and other provisions, enables the Nation's legal matrix
to respond to unanticipated developments without doing violence
to the original intent theory. Any doubters should be convinced by
a visual examination of the mountainous legal volumes comprising
the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulation.
Furthermore, the process for amending the Constitution was
the intended method for insuring against antiquation, as opposed to
judicial renunciation of the doctrine of original intent. Indeed, the
initial task of the First Congress was to propose constitutional
amendments styled the Bill of Rights to check the powers of the
federal government. James Madison, a primary author of the Bill of
Rights, certainly did not believe its protections might have been cre-
ated by the Supreme Court through inventive constitutional
interpretation.
Constitutional amendments, moreover, are not invariably lead-
footed. The Bill of Rights was ratified in less than two years, the
eleventh amendment in less than one year, and the thirteenth
amendment abolishing slavery in approximately ten months. Most
recently, the eighteen-year-old voting rights amendment 2', was rati-
fied in thirteen weeks. Thus, it is wrong to slight the power of
amendment as too sluggish for practical utility.
Considered together, the legislative powers of Congress and
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
20. See id. at 353-59.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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the amending power discredit the argument that we cannot enjoy
both a "living Constitution" and the doctrine of original intent for
its construction.
A second argument against original intent is that its discovery is
too difficult. Justice Brennan articulated the criticism in this way:
It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we can
gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application
of principle to specific, contemporary questions. All too
often, sources of potential enlightenment such as records
of the ratification debates provide spurious or ambiguous
evidence of the original intention. Typically, all that can be
gleaned is that the Framers themselves did not agree about
the application or meaning of particular constitutional pro-
visions, and hid their differences in cloaks of generality.
Indeed, it is far from clear whose intention is relevant-
that of the drafters, the congressional disputants, or the ra-
tifiers in the state?-or even whether the idea of an original
intention is a coherent way of thinking about a jointly
drafted document drawing its authority from the general
assent of the states.22
Each of Brennan's quarrels with original intent is flawed. If the
history or debate surrounding a constitutional clause is sparse or
unedifying, then prime reliance should be placed on explicit consti-
tutional text. That language is to be read with reference to its ac-
cepted meaning in Anglo-American common law. As the Supreme
Court acknowledged in 1925, when the founding fathers "came to
put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact
draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident
that they could be shortly and easily understood. ' 2 ' And if the com-
mon-law meaning of the constitutional text is inconclusive, then the
interpretation most harmonious with the nature, projects, scope,
and design of the Constitution should be embraced.
Justice Brennan exaggerates the prevalence of significant ambi-
guity in ascertaining original intent. Notes of the Constitutional
Convention and state ratification debates are frequently illuminat-
ing. The President's pardon power, for instance, was clearly fash-
ioned to enable its use before a criminal conviction. In addition, The
Federalist Papers 1 4 and the Anti-Federalist pamphlets 25 lend fuller un-
22. W. Brennan, supra note 4, at 4.
23. Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925).
24. For a commonly cited edition of this collection of essays by James Madison, Alex-
ander Hamilton, and John Jay, see THE FEDERALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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derstanding of the Constitution's structure and particular clauses.
The actions of the First Congress and the constellation of state laws
in place when the Constitution was adopted are also informative. It
is improbable that the Constitution was intended to invalidate state
laws that were commonplace in 1787 without explicit debate of the
matter. Similarly, it is unlikely that the First Congress, numbering
among its leaders those who had been members of the Constitu-
tional Convention, would have enacted laws, such as the death pen-
alty for treason, at war with original intent without encountering
heated dissent.
In searching for original intent, if the drafters, congressional
disputants, or ratifiers voiced conflicting or elliptical views, then the
constitutional text should be dispositive, read in light of its accepted
common-law meaning. It was the text, after all, that was ultimately
agreed upon by the participants in forging and ratifying the
Constitution.
Concededly, there may be occasions when two different judges,
both genuinely dedicated to interpretation by original intent, may
disagree because constitutional history or text is equivocal. But
these disagreements as to constitutional meaning are likely to be
small and pose no threat to a coherent, predictable constitutional
jurisprudence. The majority of cases addressed under an original
intent banner are akin to deciding whether New York City is geo-
graphically nearer to Boston than to San Francisco, a process leav-
ing considerable latitude for imprecise calculation. Moreover, the
sincere use of original intent as the interpretive touchstone narrowly
circumscribes the range ofjudicial outcomes in a way that makes the
Constitution a government of laws, not of men.
Some argue a special case for judicial power to interpret the
fourteenth amendment. It is urged that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the amendment were intentionally nebulous so
as to invite the Supreme Court to expound the provisions as the
Justices thought would be wise and enlightened. Due process of
law, however, had a defined, crystallized common-law meaning. As
Alexander Hamilton declared on the eve of the Convention: "The
words 'due process' have a precise technical import, and are only appli-
cable to the process and proceedings of courts of justice; they can
never be referred to the act of the legislature.""' And according to the
25. For a recent one-volume compilation of Anti-Federalist writings, see THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed. & M. Dry abr. 1985).
26. THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett &J. Cooke ed. 1962).
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Supreme Court in Hurtado v. California,27 when due process was em-
bodied in the fourteenth amendment, it was used in the same sense
and to no greater effect than was its use in the Bill of Rights ratified
in 1791.
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was fur-
ther clarified by subsequent action in Congress. In 1875, for in-
stance, Congressman James G. Blaine proposed a constitutional
amendment prohibiting any state from making "any law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."28 Blaine and twenty-three other members of the 1875
Congress were part of the Congress that framed the fourteenth
amendment. Their views were fortified by an 1875 declaration of
Chief Justice Waite in United States v. Cruikshank 29 that the due pro-
cess clause did not incorporate the first amendment right to
assembly.
The evidence is overwhelming that the framers of the four-
teenth amendment did not conceive of the due process clause as an
open-ended grant of power to the Supreme Court to apply the Bill
of Rights to the states, either wholesale or retail. Section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment reinforces this conclusion. It deputes Con-
gress, not the courts, as its primary enforcer, a fact emphasized by
Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases.3"
Congress profoundly distrusted the Supreme Court during the
time when the fourteenth amendment was adopted and ratified.
The Court's ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford" was anathema to the
Reconstruction Congress. And the Court's twin rulings in the Test
Oath Cases, its defense of President Andrew Johnson's pardon
power in United States v. Klein," and its refusal to compel President
Johnson to enforce the Reconstruction Acts in Mississippi v. John-
son,33 further sullied its reputation in Congress. It blinks reality to
believe that the Reconstruction Congress, so hostile to the Supreme
Court, would nevertheless have endowed it with unbridled discre-
tion to interpret the due process or equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.
Despite its historical record, the due process clause of the four-
27. 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884).
28. CONG. GLOBE, Cong., 2d Sess. (1876).
29. 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
30. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
31. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
32. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
33. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
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teenth amendment has been employed by the Supreme Court since
1897 to incorporate many provisions of the Bill of Rights to restrict
state power: the first amendment;3 4 the fourth amendment;3 5 the
fifth amendment prohibitions against compulsory self-incrimination
and double jeopardy, and the taking of private property for a public
purpose without just compensation; 36 the sixth amendment rights to
jury trial, counsel, compulsory process, and cross-examination;3 7
and the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ments.3 1 It would militate against the desired stability of legal doc-
trine if these cases were brought under the flag of original intent.
Generally the decisions have received community acceptability,
notwithstanding the Court's flawed reasoning.
Original intent theory, however, retains contemporary four-
teenth amendment significance. Several provisions of the Bill of
Rights have not as yet been applied to states by the Supreme Court
under the incorporation theory: the second amendment right to
bear arms; the fifth amendment requirement of grand jury indict-
ments to initiate criminal prosecutions; the seventh amendment
right to civil jury trials; and the eighth amendment prohibition of
excessive bail. Fidelity to the fourteenth amendment and an under-
standing of the original intent theory should strengthen the Court's
resolve to resist any further incorporation doctrine decrees.
Like the due process clause, the equal protection clause was not
intended by its authors as a gelatinous phrase to be reshaped by
judicial caprice or perceptions of social fairness. The primary if not
exclusive purpose of the clause was to safeguard against invidious
racial discrimination. As Justice Miller wrote in the Slaughter-House
Cases:
34. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free enterprise clause); Hague v. Commit-
tee for Industrial Reorganization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (freedom of petition); Dejonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (free press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (free speech).
35. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applicable to
states); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating fourth amendment, but
holding states not bound by exclusionary rule).
36. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination); Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (condemnation of private property).
37. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to appointed counsel); Washington v. Texas.
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(right to confrontation).
38. See, e.g., Louisiana e. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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We doubt very much whether any action of a state not di-
rected by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provi-
sion for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.3 9
Even before ratification of the fourteenth amendment, Congress
granted a municipal franchise to blacks in the District of
Columbia.4"
The original intent doctrine is said by some to be inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's primary mission as a protector of minority
rights. James Madison, they note, applauded the Bill of Rights be-
cause the "independent tribunals ofjustice ... will be naturally led
to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in
the Constitution by the declaration of rights."'" But Madison's
praise of the judiciary was limited to its defense of expressly stipu-
lated rights, not judicially invented ones.
In addition, the individual right to vote for elected officials is
hollow if the Supreme Court can invalidate, under the banner of
minority rights, the policies and laws preferred by the majority. The
whole purpose of elections is to subordinate the wishes of political
minorities to political majorities, subject to the express and in-
tended restraints on majoritarianism incorporated in the
Constitution.
The founding fathers, moreover, engineered a system of sepa-
rated and diffuse nonjudicial authorities to prevent oppressive legis-
lation. The Congress is bicameral. Members of the House of
Representatives serve two-year terms and represent districts that
embrace many discrete and frequently antagonistic political fac-
tions. House members are apportioned among the states on the ba-
sis of population.
In contrast, each state is entitled to two Senators, who are
elected from statewide constituencies for six-year terms. Senate
terms are staggered to prevent an impulsive public sentiment from
dominating congressional action through a single biennial election.
Before ratification of the seventeenth amendment,4" Senators were
insulated from public will through election by state legislatures.
The President is elected for a four-year term from fifty varied
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
40. Act of January 8, 1867, ch. 6, § 1, 14 Stat. 375.
41. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (providing for the popular election of Senators).
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state constituencies and the District of Columbia. Presidential veto
authority can check improvident or ill-humored congressional ac-
tion. On the other hand, members of Congress can serve indefi-
nitely, while the twenty-second amendment limits a President to two
terms.
4 3
As an auxiliary precaution against abuse of government author-
ity, the Constitution preserved large domains of policymaking for
the states. As Thomas Jefferson observed, "[T]he true barriers of
our liberty in this country are our state governments; and the wisest
conservative power ever contrived by man, is that which our Revolu-
tion and present government found us possessed. '
4 4
The Constitution's nonjudicial strategy to protect against legis-
lative oppression has enjoyed mixed success. In the area of race
relations, for instance, laws that proliferated in the aftermath of Re-
construction blatantly discriminated against blacks. On the other
hand, since 1948 the Nation has witnessed President Truman's de-
segregation of the armed forces; Executive orders issued by Presi-
dents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon mandating affirmative action
programs aiding minorities and females by federal government con-
tractors; the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts;4 5 the Equal Pay
Act of 1963;46 the Voting Rights Act of 1965;47 the 1967 Age Dis-
crimination Act;48 the 1968 Fair Housing Act; 49 Title IX of the 1972
Education Act Amendments;5  the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; 5'
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973;52 the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act;53 the Education for All Handi-
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (providing that no person shall be elected President
more than twice, and no person who has served more than two years of another's term
shall be elected more than once).
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Destutt Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), reprinted in D.
MALONE, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 394 (1962).
45. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended
at scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L.
No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 18, 20, and 42
U.S.C. (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691f (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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capped Children Act of 1975;54 the ten-percent minority construc-
tion quota in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977;55 and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.56 Political liberals ap-
plauded Congress for legislation that established a holiday to cele-
brate Martin Luther King's birthday, 7 increased funding for the
Legal Services Corporation, 58 and augmented women's and minor-
ity rights in the Retirement Equity Act of 198459 and the Voting
Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act.6"
In legislative assemblies today controversies generally swirl
around whether minorities deserve preferences over nonminorities.
Equal opportunity as a norm is virtually universally accepted.
It is thus wrong to conceive of the Supreme Court as the para-
mount and indispensable defense against oppressive majorities.
Nonjudicial institutions play the primary role, with the courts mak-
ing cameo appearances. As Justice Holmes observed, "It must be
remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts. '"61
Indeed, in the Civil Rights Cases62 the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional the 1875 Civil Rights Act,6 3 fashioned by Congress to pro-
tect blacks against racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation. And, of course, Plessy v. Ferguson6 4 gave constitu-
tional benediction to scores of racially discriminatory laws.
Some maintain that even if the original intent theory is sound,
its contemporary use is unacceptable because cornerstones of mod-
ern constitutional jurisprudence would be threatened. Some critics
have argued that the original intent theory would occasion the over-
ruling of Brown v. Board of Education,65 the one person, one vote deci-
667sions, 6 decisions banning organized public school prayer,6 7 the
54. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.
(1982)).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6704(f) (1982).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 6103 (Supp. III 1985).
58. Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 101(b), 100 Stat. 1783-69 (1986).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. III 1985).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ee to 1973ee-6 (Supp. 1II 1985).
61. Missouri, Kansas & Texas R.R. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
62. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
63. 18 Stat. 335 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.
(1982)).
64. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. See. e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (election of school
trustees); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (election of county commis-
sioners); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (election of state legislators); Wesberrv
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landmark abortion decree of Roe v. Wade, 68 and the celebrated Mi-
randa v. Arizona 6 9 edicts governing custodial police interrogations.
Furthermore, the Bill of Rights might be held generally inapplicable
to the states by virtue of the due process mandate of the fourteenth
amendment if the original doctrine were to dictate constitutional
interpretation.
But apprehensions that the original intent theory would engen-
der revolutionary changes in the Nation's jurisprudence and disturb
settled expectations are unfounded. The values of continuity and
predictability in the law, cloaked in the doctrine of stare decisis,
would militate against a wholesale retroactive application of original
intent theory to reverse long-standing constitutional pronounce-
ments. Decisions of the Supreme Court should not, in the words of
Justice Roberts, be tantamount to restricted railroad tickets, "good
for this day and train only." 7
But stare decisis is not an invariable command. The Supreme
Court has reversed over 250 prior rulings, including the Plessy v. Fer-
guson 7 ruling sanctifying the separate but equal doctrine. The Na-
tion's social or political fabric would not be threatened if Roe v.
Wade,7 2 Miranda v. Arizona," the one person, one vote principle,"4 or
the ban on school prayer were reversed.75 And even if Brown v.
Board of Education76 were overruled, a constitutional amendment
prohibiting racial discrimination by government would surely be
ratified almost instantaneously.
Moreover, if Supreme Court decrees offensive to the doctrine
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (election of congressional representatives); Gray v. Sand-
ers, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (election of state officials by weighted voting system).
67. See, e.g., Wallace v. jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (daily moment of silence); Abing-
ton School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (classroom prayers and Bible read-
ings); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (recitation of officially promulgated prayer).
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
70. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
71. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
74. The one person, one vote principle was invoked by the Court in Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to strike down an Alabama reapportionment scheme based
on outdated census figures. The practical effect of using the outdated figures was to give
a greater voice to individual voters in districts whose population had not grown as con-
siderably as the population of other districts. Citing equal protection theory, the Court
held that "an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired
when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens
living in other parts of the State." Id. at 568. See also cases cited supra note 66.
75. See cases cited supra note 67.
76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of original intent reflect wise public policy, Congress and state legis-
latures can be expected to enact laws echoing such policies, even if
they are no longer constitutional imperatives. Further, state courts
interpreting state constitutions frequently protect rights that are not
safeguarded by the United States Constitution. In recent years, over
350 state court decisions have proclaimed rights under state law that
the United States Supreme Court has held unprotected by the fed-
eral constitution, especially in the areas of criminal law and equal
educational opportunities.77 The doctrine of original intent, there-
fore, does not presage a radical transformation of the prevailing
legal landscape.
Those who assail the original intent theory proffer no substitute
standard to constrain judicial whim or caprice in constitutional adju-
dication. Justice Brennan suggests that "the supremacy of the
human dignity of every individual" should be the lodestar of consti-
tutional construction.78 But every Justice's concept of human dig-
nity is personal. The concept leaves judicial discretion untethered.
A human dignity standard permits judges to adjudicate according to
their individual sense of fairness and wisdom. As Justice Benjamin
Cardozo cautioned, "Benevolent judges empowered to adjudicate
according to their individual sense ofjustice might produce a benev-
olent despotism, but such a regime would put an end to the reign of
law."
79
The human dignity theory of constitutional jurisprudence also
flouts the Constitution's separation of powers and system of checks
and balances. Justices could manipulate the theory to achieve virtu-
ally any constitutional result they desired. Judicial omnipotence
over public policy would be the consequence.
The founding fathers intended to check the power of all organs
of government, including the Supreme Court. They were not Polly-
annas, believing in a magnanimous or altruistic human nature. As
James Madison trumpeted in The Federalist No. 51, "[I]f men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to gov-
77. See, e.g., State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1980) (rejecting Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), and allowing warrantless investigatory search of vehicle
seized and removed to police station); Commonwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d
1309 (1979) (rejecting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), and requiring an
explicit waiver of Miranda rights). For a discussion of the extra protections often af-
forded under state statutes and constitutions, see Greenhalgh, Independence and Adequate
State Grounds: The Long and Short of It, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE 211 (B. McGraw ed. 1985).
78. See W. Brennan, supra note 4, at 9.
79. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136 (1921).
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ern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary.""
The human dignity theory of constitutional interpretation re-
quires the Nation to place ultimate trust in the benevolence, wis-
dom, and statesmanship of the Supreme Court. It is wholly
irreconcilable with Alexander Hamilton's characterization of the ju-
diciary in The Federalist No. 78 as the least dangerous branch and
lacking authority to construe the Constitution according to its
spirit.8 ' The original intent standard of constitutional interpreta-
tion transcends partisan politics. The standard may indirectly aid a
liberal political agenda, as during the Presidency of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, or a conservative political agenda, as during President
Reagan's tenure in office. But the most important beneficiaries of
the standard are the people and regime of law. When unelected
federal judges make policy through inventive constitutional inter-
pretations, political power is stolen from the citizenry.
Experience demonstrates that when the Supreme Court rejects
the original intent theory to inform its constitutional pronounce-
ments, the consequence is judicial lawlessness and frustration of le-
gitimate legislative compromise. From the 1820 Missouri
Compromise 82 to the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act,83 for instance,
Congress struggled with the issue of slavery in the territories. While
legislative compromises did not settle the slavery question, they
held the Nation together. In violation of original intent, the
Supreme Court decreed in Dred Scott v. Sandford8 4 that Congress
lacked constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the territories. As
a result, legislative compromise was no longer possible, and the war
came.
Faithful to original intent, Congress used a federal income tax
to pay for the costs of the Civil War. In 1895, however, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal income tax on in-
come derived from real or personal property. 5 The decision aggra-
vated class conflict within the country. And it would have disabled
the United States from active participation in World War I for lack
of revenue if the income tax amendment had not been ratified in
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521-30 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
82. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548.
83. Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277, 277-90.
84. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
85. Pollack v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1985).
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The Supreme Court further accentuated division between labor
and management by creating a due process right of contract to in-
validate minimum wage, maximum hour, child labor, and unioniza-
tion laws.8 7 As a consequence, workplaces frequently resembled
battlefields through the 1930s until the Court sustained the National
Labor Relations Act. 88
Today some Justices insist that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional, despite overwhelming evidence that our constitutional au-
thors intended capital punishment to be permissible. Legislators,
executive officials, and juries have displayed commendable restraint
and caution in considering death sentences. The public manifestly
desires to retain capital punishment for particular crimes, as recent
judicial elections in California confirm. A Supreme Court ruling de-
fying original intent and striking down the death penalty would
arouse public passions and perhaps provoke a backlash of draconian
anticrime measures. That would be unfortunate for the evolution of
enlightened criminal law policy.
In its ill-starred abortion rulings, the Supreme Court has
strayed from original intent and damaged the public policymaking
process. The Court conjured up a right of privacy in Roe v. Wade89
to scuttle the responsible efforts of legislators to accommodate the
interests of the fetus, mother, father, and minor children in abortion
decisions. The Court ordained a virtually limitless right of the
mother to an abortion and made all other interests subservient. The
Nation has suffered political scars from the abortion decrees, and
the people have lost power and genuine responsibility for debating
and fashioning abortion policy.
Legislators are better suited than the courts to address conten-
tious issues. Statutes can incorporate special rules or exemptions to
satisfy the distinct needs or desires of constituent groups. While not
intellectually tidy, statutes allow many contending theories of public
policy to emerge partially victorious and can assuage a host of polit-
ical demands. Policy thereby evolves in a way that avoids sharp
breaks with the past so jarring to community tranquility.
Supreme Court decrees lack the suppleness of legislative ac-
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
87. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum hour); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (child labor); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) ("yellow dog" contracts).
88. See NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
89. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tion. They generally cannot accommodate special needs or circum-
stances that are commonplace in a heterogeneous nation. And they
frequently cause unsettling upheavals in the legal landscape, such as
in the school prayer decisions in the early 1960s.
The bipartisan nature of the original intent controversy is
demonstrated by recounting President Franklin D. Roosevelt's use
of national broadcasting to assail the Supreme Court's arrogation of
policymaking power constitutionally assigned to Congress. Presi-
dent Roosevelt charged:
When the Congress has sought to stabilize national ag-
riculture, to improve the conditions of labor, to safeguard
business against unfair competition, to protect our national
resources, and in many other ways, to serve our clearly na-
tional needs, the majority of the Court has been assuming
the power to pass on the wisdom of these Acts of Con-
gress-and to approve or disapprove the public policy writ-
ten into these laws.
We have . . . reached the point as a Nation where we
must take action to save the Constitution from the Court
and the Court from itself .... We want a Supreme Court
which will do justice under the Constitution-not over it.
In our Courts we want a government of laws and not of
men.
9 0
It speaks volumes that Justice Brennan relies on Weems v. United
States,9 a case reflecting an interpretive doctrine that precipitated
President Roosevelt's remonstrance against the Supreme Court, to
justify an amorphous human dignity theory of constitutional inter-
pretation. In Weems Justice McKenna wrote:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occa-
sions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice John
Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it." The future is their
care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies
of which no prophesy can be made. In the application of a
90. F.D. Roosevelt, A "Fireside Chat" Discussing the Plan for Reorganization of the
Judiciary in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 9, 1937), reprinted in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 122 (S. Rosenman comp. 1941).
91. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only
of what has been, but of what may be.92
As Attorney General Edwin Meese has observed, the Weems rul-
ing directly flouted Thomas Jefferson's teaching:
On every question of construction [we should] carry our-
selves back to the time, when the constitution was adopted;
recollect the spirit manifested in the debates; and instead
of trying [to find], what meaning may be squeezed out of
the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable
one, in which it was passed.9 3
Further, Justice McKenna ignored that Marshall was trumpeting the
power of legislative, not judicial, authority to respond to new
circumstances.94
Finally, some insist that the Supreme Court should act as the
Nation's moral conscience, irrespective of original intent. But
Court decisions are legion that have aroused moral disapprobation:
cases holding that blacks are barred from United States citizenship
and can be excluded from party primary elections;95 that Congress
cannot proscribe slavery in territories, or racial discrimination in
public places, or private acts of violence against black citizens;96 that
the Fugitive Slave Act was constitutional, but that state laws pro-
scribing the use of force or violence in the capture of slaves were
prohibited; 97 that women may be denied the franchise and access to
the legal profession on account of gender, and may be stripped of
American citizenship for marriage to an alien; 98 that segregation of
blacks and citizens of Chinese ancestry in public institutions is con-
stitutionally irreproachable; 99 that federal child labor laws and fed-
eral taxation of the net income derived from real or personal
property are unconstitutional;'0 0 that citizens of Japanese ancestry
92. Id. at 373.
93. E. Meese, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society, Lawyers'
Division 6 (Nov. 15, 1985) (available at the Iailand Law Review).
94. See id. at 5.
95. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
96. See id. at 396.
97. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
98. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (suffrage); Bradwall v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (practice of law); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299
(1915) (marriage to alien).
99. See Cumming v. County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (exclusion of black
student from white public school); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (exclusion of
Chinese student from white public school).
100. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (child labor); Pollack v. Farmer's
Loan & Trust Co., 155 U.S. 429 (1895) (income tax).
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may, without evidence of disloyalty, be forcibly relocated during
wartime;' ° that constitutional due process bars minimum wage and
maximum hour regulation and statutes condemning "yellow dog"
contracts; 012 that restrictions on an employer's right to enjoin
strikes violate equal protection norms, and that labor boycotts vio-
late the Sherman Act;' 0 3 that school children can be compelled to
salute the flag;' °4 that citizenship should be denied an elderly paci-
fist female immigrant for refusal to bear arms; 105 that the mentally
retarded may be sterilized involuntarily; 10 6 that states may prohibit
Japanese aliens ineligible for United States citizenship from owning
land;'0 7 and that a law could apply retroactively to exclude from the
United States Chinese laborers who departed the country when the
law entitled them to re-entry. 0 8
The list must stop as a concession to the shortness of life. But
do these decisions embody the moral conscience of our Nation?
Moreover, even if the Supreme Court decisions misconstruing
the Constitution seem temporarily to advance some higher morality
or public good, they still blemish our legal order and endanger law.
As Sir Thomas More is said to have explained:
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's
right. And I'll stick to what's legal.... I'm not God. The
currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find
such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in
the thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester. . . . What
would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get
after the Devil?.... And when the last law was down, and
the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide,
Roper, the laws all being flat? . . . This country's planted
thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws, not
God's-and if you cut them down ... d'you think you could
stand upright in the winds that would blow them?'0°
101. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
102. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum hour); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
(contracts forbidding employees to join union).
103. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (right to enjoin strikes); Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (Sherman Act).
104. See Minorsville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
105. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
106. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
107. See Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923).
108. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case).
109. TxA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (quoting R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons,
Act I, p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967)).
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Thus, Judge Bork is surely correct in avowing "that only by lim-
iting themselves to the historic intentions underlying each clause of
the Constitution can judges avoid becoming legislators, avoid en-
forcing their own moral predilections, and ensure that the Constitu-
tion is law.'' Io
110. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 823, 832 (1986) (address before the University of San Diego School of Law).
1987] 215
